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Abstract
The problem of achieving the secrecy capacity of static adversarial wiretap channel with discrete
memoryless channels is studied in this paper. To construct the explicit secure coding scheme, an irregular
channel polarization operation is proposed which is the extension of Arıkan’s channel polarization. As
theoretically proofed, for N independent initial channels with different transition probabilities, channels
generated by the operation GN are also polarized into full noise channels and noiseless channels, same
as the regular channel polarization. Then for the adversarial behaviors including directly reading and
rewriting, equivalent channels are constructed by channel cascading with full noise or noiseless binary
erase channels. Finally by applying the irregular channel polarization to the equivalent channels, a secure
polar coding scheme is constructed which successfully achieves the secrecy capacity of static adversarial
wiretap channel with discrete memoryless channels under the reliability and strong security criterions.
Index Terms
adversarial wiretap channel, irregular channel polarization, secrecy capacity, secure polar coding,
strong security, reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The open problem of secrecy capacity achieving was introduced by Wyner in 1975 [1], along
with his original wiretap channel (WTC) model in which eavesdropper can wiretapping the
communication of legitimate parties through a degraded noisy wiretap channel. In his pioneering
work, Wyner had shown the existence of channel noise based codes which can achieve the secrecy
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2capacity against the noisy channel type wiretapping approaches. Then in the follow-up work of
Wyner and Ozarow [2], wiretap channel type II (WTC-II) was proposed with a direct type of
wiretapping approach as that eavesdropper can directly read a certain part of the transmitted
information from the noiseless main channel. Based on this directly reading, some channel level
modification works were proposed, such as the noise extend WTC-II models [3]–[5] and the
multi-access extended WTC-II model [6]. Then as an extension on the adversarial behavior, [7]
presented an active WTC-II in which eavesdropper not only directly read a certain part of the
transmitted information, but also modify the bits observed. Later the adversarial wiretap channel
(A-WTC) was proposed and studied by [8], in which eavesdropper can read and rewrite certain
parts of the transmitted information directly and independently. Compared with the original WTC,
secrecy capacities of WTC-II (including those channel level modified models) and A-WTC are
much harder to achieve because of their directly adversarial approaches.
In the last decade, remarkable progress had been made for solving Wyner’s secrecy capacity
achieving problem owing to the invention of Arıkan’s polar code [9]. Secrecy capacities of
original WTC [10], [11] and several extended WTCs [12]–[15] had been achieved by explicitly
constructed secure polar coding schemes in which variations of the polarization between the noisy
main channel and the noisy wiretap channel is well designed for obtaining a secure and reliable
transmission, which perfectly matches Wyner’s idea of noise based secure coding. However for
WTC-II or A-WTC, achieving the secrecy capacity by secure polar coding scheme is much more
complicated due to the following problems.
• For A-WTC (WTC-II included), adversarial approaches such as directly reading and rewrit-
ing are not channel based, thus secure polar coding is hard to implement directly.
• It is hard to design a passive secure coding scheme which can cover the initiative of the
eavesdropper, since the information parts for reading and rewriting can be arbitrarily chosen.
In this paper, we focus on the solving the first problem by exploring an explicit secure polar
coding scheme to against the directly reading and rewriting from the eavesdropper in A-WTC.
Specifically, our work is set up on a static A-WTC with noisy discrete memoryless channels (sA-
WTC with DMCs), which assumes that legitimate parties know the exact eavesdropper behavior
state (EBS, similar as the channel state information, CSI) including the reading part, rewriting
part and the transition probability of the main channel. This static assumption is set for removing
the initiative of the eavesdropper in A-WTC.
The contributions of our work are as follow:
3• We have presented an irregular channel polarization which is the extension of Arıkan’s
channel polarization theory. As we proofed, for N = 2n and DMCs W 1:N with different
transition probabilities, by performing a similar channel combing and channel splitting
(GN), the generated channels are also polarized into full-noise channels and noiseless
channels respectively with probabilities 1 − A[I(W 1:N)] and A[I(W 1:N)] when N → ∞,
similar as the original channel polarization;
• For the directly reading and rewriting in A-WTC, we have presented a equivalent model
by replacing the reading and rewriting behaviors with noiseless BECs or full-noise BECs;
• For sA-WTC with DMCs, we have constructed a secure polar coding scheme by applying
the irregular polarization to the equivalent model, and achieved the secrecy capacity under
the reliability and strong security criterions.
The outline of this paper is as follow. Section II introduces the sA-WTC with DMCs and
its secrecy capacity achieving problem. Section III presents the irregular channel polarization.
Section IV presents the equivalent channel model for A-WTC and the construction of irregular
secure polar coding scheme on the equivalent channel. Section V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Notation: We define the integer interval [[a, b]] as the integer set between bac and dbe. For
n ∈ N, define N , 2n. Denote X , Y , Z,... random variables (RVs) taking values in alphabets
X , Y , Z ,... and the sample values of these RVs are denoted by x, y, z,... respectively. Then
pXY denotes the joint probability of X and Y , and pX , pY denotes the marginal probabilities.
Especially for channel W , the transition probability is defined as WY |X and W for simplicity.
Also we denote a N size vector X1:N , (X1, X2, ..., XN). When the context makes clear that
we are dealing with vectors, we write XN in place of X1:N . And for any index set A j [[1, N ]],
we define XA , {X i}i∈A. For the polar codes, we denote GN the generator matrix , R the bit
reverse matrix, F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
and ⊗ the Kronecker product, and we have GN = RF⊗n. Denote
A[·] as the average and E[·] as the expectation.
Firstly, we introduce the sA-WTC with DMCs.
Definition 1 The static adversarial wiretap channel with discrete memoryless channels (sA-
WTC with DMCs) is defined as (X ,Y ,Z,V , V˜ ,WV |X , W˜V˜ |Z , ρr, ρw,Sr,Sw). The model contains
4two symmetric discrete memoryless channels, the main channel WN and the wiretap channel
W˜N with block length N and transition probabilities WV |X ,W˜V˜ |Z respectively. X is the input
alphabet of main channel, V is the output alphabet of main channel and V˜ is the output alphabet
of wiretap channel channel. For all (xN , vN , v˜N) ∈ X × V × V˜ , have
WN(v1:N |x1:N) =
N∏
i=1
W (vi|xi)
W˜N(v˜1:N |x1:N) =
N∏
i=1
W˜ (v˜i|xi)
(2)
Subset Sr ⊆ [[1, N ]] is the arbitrarily selected index set for reading, satisfies |Sr| = Nρr. Subset
Sw ⊆ [[1, N ]] is the arbitrarily selected index set for rewriting, satisfies |Sw| = Nρw. According
to the static assumption, both (ρr, ρw) and (Sr,Sw) are known by the legitimate parties when
encoding and decoding. Then the rewriting operation is defined as
Y i =
? if i ∈ SwV i otherwise (3)
where ”?” is the dump letter, V N is the input of the rewriting operation and Y N is the output
for legitimate receiver with alphabet Y . The reading operation is defined as
Zi =
V˜
i if i ∈ Sr
? otherwise
(4)
where ZN is the output for eavesdropper with alphabet Z .
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Fig. 1. The sA-WTC with DMCs.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, for the sA-WTC with DMCs in Definition 1, have
5• Alice: encodes the message M into codewords XN and transmit it to Bob over the main
channel WN with channel output V N .
• Eve: rewrites the bits of V Sw into dump letter ? and outputs Y N . Reads the bits of V˜ Sr
form wiretap channel W˜N and fills V˜ Scr with ? to form the observed information ZN .
• Bob: finally receives the transmitted and modified codewords as Y N and decodes it into
estimated information Mˆ .
Definition 2 For sA-WTC with DMCs, define a (2NR, N) secure code CN , then the performance
of CN can be measured as follow.
• Reliability is measured by error probability Pe(CN) = Pr(M 6= Mˆ). And the reliability
criterion is defined as limN→∞ Pe(CN) = 0.
• Security is measured by information leakage L(CN) = I(ZN ;M). And the strong security
criterion is defined as limN→∞ L(CN) = 0.
Theorem 1 (Secrecy capacity) For the A-WTC with DMCs, assuming a uniformly distributed
input and |U| = |X |, then under the reliability and strong security criterions, the secrecy capacity
Cs is upper bounded by
Cs = max
U→X→Y,Z
[
(1− ρw)I(U ;V )− ρrI(U ; V˜ )
]
(5)
Proof: Generally from [16], since the Markov chain M → U → X → Y, Z holds, have
Cs = max
U→X→Y,Z
[I (U ;Y )− I (U ;Z)] (6)
According to [4, Theorem 1], in case ρw = 0 and |U| ≤ |X |, the secrecy capacity satisfies
Cs = max
U→X→Y,Z
[
I(U ;Y )− ρrI(U ; V˜ )
]
(7)
Thus by comparing the effects of the reading and rewriting operations to Eve and Bob, as the
corollary for ρw 6= 0, we can have
Cs = max
U→X→Y,Z
[
(1− ρw)I(U ;V )− ρrI(U ; V˜ )
]
(8)
Note that this A-WTC with DMCs is a general model for the following particular cases.
• In case ρw = 0 and ρr = 0, it turns to the non-degraded WTC with secrecy capacity
max [I (U ;Y )− I (U ;Z)].
6• In case ρw = 0 with noiseless WN and W˜N , it turns to the WTC-II [2] with secrecy capacity
1− ρr.
• In case ρw = 0 with noiseless W˜N , it turns to the extended WTC-II studied in [3] with
secrecy capacity max
[
I (U ;Y )− ρrI
(
U ; V˜
)]
.
• In case ρw = 0 and WN = W˜N , it turns to the extended WTC-II studied in [5] with secrecy
capacity max [I (U ;V ) (1− ρr)].
• In case WN and W˜N are noiseless, it turns to the A-WTC studied in [8] with secrecy
capacity 1− ρr − ρw for perfect secrecy.
In this paper, we intend to construct an explicit secure polar coding scheme to achieve the
secrecy capacity of the sA-WTC with DMCs under the reliability and strong security criterion,
which is an universal secrecy capacity achieving solution for all the listed models under the
static assumption.
III. IRREGULAR CHANNEL POLARIZATION
Channel polarization was first introduced by Arıkan in [9]. In his theory, N = 2n independent
copies of channel W , the WN , can be polarized into noiseless channels and full-noise channels
respectively with probabilities I(W ) and 1−I(W ) by liner operation GN when N goes infinity.
In this section, we will discuss an irregular case of this channel polarization that replace the
WN with N independent and different channels W 1:N , and study its polarization properties.
Theoretical results of this irregular polarization will be used for constructing the irregular polar
coding scheme for sA-WTC with DMCs.
A. Recursive Structure of Irregular Channel Transformation
In the regular polarized channel transformation, the whole combining and splitting operation
can be broken recursively into single step 2×2 kernel transformation, as (W,W ) 7→ (W−,W+),
where W− : X → Y˜ , W+ : X → Y˜ × X and a one-to-one mapping f : Y2 → Y˜ . Then for
irregular channel transformation, we keep the original framework of channel combining and
splitting of the polar channel transformation as GN , but just replace the initial channels WN by
W 1:N where W i : X → Y is independent from others with different W iY |X .
Definition 3 Define the irregular 2×2 kernel transformation illustrated in Fig. 2b as (W 1,W 2) 7→
(W−,W+) which contains a channel operation pair (,) that
W− = W 1 W 2 and W+ = W 1 W 2 (9)
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the 2× 2 kernel between the regular polarized transformation and the irregular transformation.
specifically as
W−(f(y1, y2)|u1) =
∑
u2
1
2
W 1(y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W 2(y2|u2)
W+(f(y1, y2), u1|u2) = 1
2
W 1(y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W 2(y2|u2)
(11)
Then we perform the irregular 2× 2 kernel transformation (W 1,W 2) 7→ (W−,W+) to the N
initial channels W 1:N recursively and describe the structure of the irregular transformation for
generating the W (1:N)N .
Proposition 1 (Irregular the recursive structure) consider N independent initial B-DMC W 1:N
with N = 2n, for all q ∈ [[0, n− 1]], Q = 2q, k ∈ [[0, N
2Q
− 1]] and i ∈ [[2kQ + 1, 2kQ + Q]], by
applying the irregular 2× 2 kernel in Def. 3, we have the recursive channel transformation as
(W
(i)
Q ,W
(i+Q)
Q ) 7→ (W (2i−2kQ−1)2Q ,W (2i−2kQ)2Q ) (12)
where
W
(2i−2kQ−1)
2Q = W
(i)
Q W
(i+Q)
Q
W
(2i−2kQ)
2Q = W
(i)
Q W
(i+Q)
Q
(14)
specifically as
W
(2i−2kQ−1)
2Q (y
2kQ+1:2kQ+2Q, u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2|u2i−2kQ−1)
=
∑
u2i−2kQ
1
2
W
(i)
Q (y
2kQ+1:2kQ+Q, u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2o ⊕ u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2e |u2i−2kQ−1 ⊕ u2i−2kQ)
·W (i+Q)Q (y2kQ+Q+1:2kQ+2Q, u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2e |u2i−2kQ)
(16)
and
W
(2i−2kQ)
2Q (y
2kQ+1:2kQ+2Q, u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−1|u2i−2kQ)
=
1
2
W
(i)
Q (y
2kQ+1:2kQ+Q, u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2o ⊕ u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2e |u2i−2kQ−1 ⊕ u2i−2kQ)
·W (i+Q)Q (y2kQ+Q+1:2kQ+2Q, u2kQ+1:2i−2kQ−2e |u2i−2kQ)
(18)
8where uo refers to odd term and ue refers to even term.
The recursive relation of irregular transformation in Prop. 1 is illustrated in Fig. 3 with N = 8.
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Fig. 3. The irregular channel transformation process with W 1:N , N = 8
Since GN remains unchanged for irregular channel transformation, for all y1:N ∈ YN , u1:N ∈
XN , the relations of transition probabilities between WN and W 1:N is
WN(y
1:N |u1:N) = W 1:N(y1:N |u1:NGN) (19)
which is the same formation as the regular channel polarization.
Definition 4 ( [9]) For any given B-DMC W : X → Y , the Bhattacharyya parameter is defined
as
Z(W ) ,
∑
y∈Y
√
Wy|0W (y|1) (20)
which satisfies
log
2
1 + Z(W )
≤ I(W ) ≤
√
1− Z(W )2 (21)
where I(W ) refers to the capacity of the channel W . Specially for BEC, have I(W ) = 1−Z(W ).
Proposition 2 For irregular 2× 2 kernel transformation (W 1,W 2) 7→ (W−,W+), have
I(W−) + I(W+) = I(W 1) + I(W 2) (23)
9Proof: Note that I(W−) = I(U1;Y 1Y 2) and I(W+) = I(U2;Y 1Y 2U1), thus have
I(W−) + I(W+) =I(U1;Y 1Y 2) + I(U2;Y 1Y 2U1)
(a)
=I(U1;Y 1Y 2) + I(U2;Y 1Y 2|U1)
=I(U1U2;Y 1Y 2)
=I(U1;Y 1) + I(U2;Y 2)
=I(W 1) + I(W 2)
(25)
where (a) is duo to U1 and U2 are independent.
Proposition 3 For irregular 2× 2 kernel transformation (W 1,W 2) 7→ (W−,W+), have
Z(W+) = Z(W 1)Z(W 2)
Z(W−) ≤ Z(W 1) + Z(W 2)− Z(W 1)Z(W 2)
(27)
And the second equal holds when W 1, W 2 are BEC.
Proof: See Appendix A
B. Irregular Channels Polarization
As a corollary to Prop. 3, for BEC case, since I(W ) = 1− Z(W ), have
I(W−) = I(W 1)I(W 2)
I(W+) = I(W 1) + I(W 2)− I(W 1)I(W 2)
(29)
By extending this recursion to BECs W 1:N , for all q ∈ [[0, n− 1]], Q = 2q, k ∈ [[0, N
2Q
− 1]] and
i ∈ [[2kQ+ 1, 2kQ+Q]], have
I(W
(2i−2kQ−1)
2Q ) = I(W
(i)
Q )I(W
(i+Q)
Q )
I(W
(2i−2kQ)
2Q ) = I(W
(i)
Q ) + I(W
(i+Q)
Q )− I(W (i)Q )I(W (i+Q)Q )
(31)
From (31), for BEC case, we can recursively compute the I(W (1:N)N ) from the initial I(W
1:N)
for the irregular channel transformation with operation GN . As illustrated in Fig. 4 for the
result of irregular channel transformation of I(W (1:N)N ) with N = 2
10, the I(W (1:N)N ) recursively
computed form I(W 1:N) have a similar polarization effect as the regular polarized channel
transformation by using the operation GN on WN . For original channel polarization of the N
independent copy of any B-DMC W in [9], have
I∞ =
1 w.p. I(W )0 w.p. 1− I(W ) (32)
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Fig. 4. Polarization of I(W (i)N ) with N = 2
10 for irregular channel transformation. W (1:N)N are transformed from N independent
BECs W 1:N with random and different erase probabilities.
so there may be a similar polarization formation for irregular channel transformation of any
B-DMCs W 1:N . Now we discuss the polarization of the irregular channel transformation.
Proposition 4 (Irregular channel polarization) for any B-DMC W 1:N with different transition
probabilities, the generated channels W iN form irregular channel transformation GN are polar-
ized in the sense that, for any fixed δ ∈ (0, 1), as N →∞, the fraction of indices i ∈ [[1, N ]] for
which I(W iN) ∈ (1− δ, 1] goes to A[I(W 1:N)] and the fraction for which I(W iN) ∈ [0, δ) goes
to 1− A[I(W 1:N)]. Also can be write as
I∞ =
1 w.p. A[I(W
1:N)]
0 w.p. 1− A[I(W 1:N)]
(33)
where A[I(W 1:N)] is the average of the initial I(W i) for all the i ∈ [[1, N ]].
Now we proof the Prop. 4, by extending the proof work of [9, Section IV]. Consider a multi-
channel stochastic process of the irregular channel transformation as in Fig. 5, with N = 2n,
q ∈ [[0, n − 1]], Q = 2q and k ∈ [[0, N
2Q
− 1]]. Assume that n → ∞ in case of q → ∞. For the
random channel process from level q to q + 1, 0 refers the move to the upper node at level
q + 1 and 1 refers the move to the lower node both with probability 1/2. Initially at level 0,
we have W 1:N . Define a sequence b1b2...bq as the random path for W 1:N all together from level
11
0 to level q, which means all the channels take the same random moves. Also note that for
i ∈ [[2kQ + 1, 2kQ + 2Q]], all the W i will move to a same node under a same q-steps random
path. For example, in Fig. 5, with the path 000, every channel of W 1:8 will moves to W (1)8 .
Also, we write W 1:Nb1b2...bq as the locate of the channels move by the path b
1b2...bq.
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Fig. 5. The multi-channel stochastic process with N = 8.
Consider the probability space (Ω,F, P ), where Ω is the space for (b1, b2, ...) ∈ {0, 1}∞, F is
the Borel field (BF) generated by S(b1, ..., bq) , {ω ∈ Ω : ω1 = b1, ..., ωq = bq}, and P is the
probability measure defined on F that P (S(b1, ..., bq)) = 1/2q. Then have F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Fq.
Further, denote K1:Nq = W
1:N
b1b2...bq as the value of the multi channel stochastic process that K
i
q =
W ib1b2...bq . Denote i.i.d. RVs {Bq; q = 1, 2, ...} that B1:q takes on the sample value b1, ..., bq. Thus
formally the multi channel stochastic process can be defined as follow. For ω = (ω1, ω2, ...) ∈
Ω and q ≥ 1, define Bq(ω) = ωq, K1:Nq (ω) = W 1:Nω1...ωq , A[I1:Nq (ω)] = A[I1:N(K1:Nq (ω))],
A[Z1:Nq (ω)] = A[Z1:N(K1:Nq (ω))]. For q = 0, define K1:N0 = W 1:N , A[I1:N0 ] = A[I(W 1:N)],
A[Z1:N0 ] = A[Z(W 1:N)]. For any fixed q ≥ 0, Bq, K1:Nq , A[I1:Nq ] and A[Z1:Nq ] are measurable
with respect to the BF F.
Note that in the multi channel stochastic process, all the channels W 1:N are taking a same
path, thus at level n, all the W 1:N will move to a same node. So we have
A[I1:N∞ ] = I∞ and A[Z1:N∞ ] = Z∞ (34)
12
Consider the following expectation
E
[
A[I1:Nq+1]|S(b1, ...bq)
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
1
2
I(W ib1...bq0) +
1
2
I(W ib1...bq1)
]
(a)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(W ib1...bq)
= A[I1:Nq ]
(36)
where (a) is due to Prop. 2 and all the W i take the same path. Thus we have martingale
{A[I1:Nq ],Fq; q ≥ 0} as
Fq ⊂ Fq+1 and A[I1:Nq ] is Fq-measurable
E
[|A[I1:Nq ]|] <∞
A[I1:Nq ] = E
[
A[I1:Nq+1]|Fq
] (38)
So have
E[I∞] = E
[
A[I1:N∞ ]
]
= A[I1:N0 ] (39)
Similarly for expectation
E
[
A[Z1:Nq+1]|S(b1, ...bq)
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
1
2
Z(W ib1...bq0) +
1
2
Z(W ib1...bq1)
]
(a)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Z(W ib1...bq)
= A[Z1:Nq ]
(41)
where (a) is due to Prop. 3 and all the W i take the same path. Thus we have supermartingale
{A[Z1:Nq ],Fq; q ≥ 0} as
Fq ⊂ Fq+1 and A[Z1:Nq ] is Fq-measurable
E
[|A[Z1:Nq ]|] <∞
A[Z1:Nq ] ≥ E
[
A[Z1:Nq+1]|Fq
] (43)
So it converges a.e. and in L1 to a RV A[Z1:N∞ ] such that
E
[|A[Z1:Nq ]− A[Z1:N∞ ]|]→∞ (44)
13
followed with E
[|A[Z1:Nq+1]− A[Z1:Nq ]|] → ∞. From Prop. 3, have that for connected i, j ∈
[[1, N ]], exists i′ ∈ [[1, N ]] that Zjq+1 = ZiqZi′q with probability 1/2 in the multi channel stochastic
process. Besides, note that
A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ZiqZ
i′
q
(a)
≤
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(Ziq)
2 · 1
N
N∑
i′=1
(Zi′q )
2
(b)
= A[(Z1:Nq )2]
≤ A[Z1:Nq ]2
(46)
where (a) is due to Cauchy’s inequality, and (b) is due to i are symmetric with i′ and Ziq, Z
i′
q ∈
Z1:Nq . Thus have
E
[|A[Z1:Nq+1]− A[Z1:Nq ]|] = E
[
1
N
|
N∑
i=1
Ziq+1 −
N∑
i=1
Ziq|
]
= E
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Ziq+1 − Ziq|
]
≥ 1
2
E
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
|ZiqZi
′
q − Ziq|
]
=
1
2
E
[
A[Z1:Nq ]− A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ]
]
(a)
≥ 1
2
E
[
A[Z1:Nq ]− A[Z1:Nq ]2
]
=
1
2
E
[
A[Z1:Nq ](1− A[Z1:Nq ])
] ≥ 0
(48)
where (a) is due (46). Since when q →∞, Z1:Nq → Z∞, have E [(1− Z∞)Z∞] = 0, which means
that Z∞ equals 0 or 1. Form Def. 4, have I∞ = 1−Z∞. Therefore, form I∞ = E[I∞] = A[I1:N0 ],
easy to have
I∞ =
1, w.p. A[I
1:N
0 ]
0, w.p. 1− A[I1:N0 ]
(49)
which completes the proof of Prop. 4.
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C. Rate of Irregular Polarization
Proposition 5 For any B-DMC W 1:N with I(W i) > 0, and any fixed R < A[I(W 1:N)] and
constant β ≤ 1/2, there exists index set AN ⊂ [[1, N ]], |AN | ≤ NR that∑
i∈AN
Z(W
(i)
N ) = o(2
−Nβ) (50)
and
Pe(N,R) = o(2
−Nβ) (51)
For regular channel polarization, its bounded rate has been rigorously proofed in [17]. For-
tunately, this pinner work can also be adapted for proofing the Prop. 5 by making a few
modifications based on the multi channel stochastic process. Note that from Def. 4, we can
have
I(W )2 + Z(W )2 ≤ 1 and I(W ) + Z(W ) ≥ 1 (52)
Thus from Prop. 4, have
Z∞ =
0 w.p. A[I
1:N
0 ]
1 w.p. 1− A[I1:N0 ]
(53)
For [17, Section II, Def. 1], we redefine Z¯z0 as the class of random process {A[Z1:Nq ] : q =
0, 1, ...} with A[Z1:N0 ] = z0 ∈ (0, 1). A[Z1:Nq ] is measurable with respect to Fq and satisfies
A[Z1:Nq+1] = A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ] if Bq+1 = 1
A[Z1:Nq+1] ∈
[
A[Z1:Nq ], 2A[Z1:Nq ]− A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ]
]
if Bq+1 = 0
(55)
by noting that 0 < A[Z1:Nq ] = A[Z1:N
′
q ] < 1 with z0 ∈ (0, 1). Let Z¯ := ∪z0∈{0,1}Z¯z0 . Since
A[Z1:Nq ] ≤ 2A[Z1:Nq ] − A[Z1:Nq Z1:N ′q ], combining with (41), we have that {A[Z1:Nq ],Fq; q ≥ 0}
of (55) is a bounded supermartingale and it converges a. e. and L1 to RV A[Z1:N∞ ].
For [17, Section IV, Def. 3], we redefine the extremal process {A[Z1:Nq ]} ∈ Z¯ as
A[Z1:Nq+1] =
A[Z
1:N
q Z
1:N ′
q ] if Bq+1 = 1
2A[Z1:Nq ]− A[Z1:Nq Z1:N ′q ] if Bq+1 = 0
(56)
Note that A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ] ≤ A[Z1:Nq Z]2 from (46) and 2A[Z1:Nq ] − A[Z1:Nq Z1:N ′q ] ≥ 2A[Z1:Nq ] −
A[Z1:Nq Z]2. Thus extremal process {A[Z1:Nq ]} also satisfies
• Extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]} is a Markov process;
• Extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]} is a bounded martingale according to (41);
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• P (Z∞ = 0) = A[Z1:N0 ] and P (Z∞ = 1) = 1− A[Z1:N0 ];
• {A[Z1:Nq ]} ∈ Z¯z0 is dominated by {A[Z1:Nq ](z0)}, {A[Z1:Nq ](α)} is dominated by {A[Z1:Nq ](β)}
for all 0 < α ≤ β < 1.
Note that {A[Z1:Nq ](z0)} refers to the extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]} process, and the dominating rela-
tionship, including the asymptotically dominating (a.d.), universally dominating (u.d.) and the
sequence {fq} ⊂ [0, 1], all follow the definition in [17, Section IV, Def. 2]. Thus we can have
that
lim inf
q→∞
P (A[Z1:Nq ] ≤ fq) ≥ P (Z∞ = 0) (57)
form [17, Section IV, Prop. 1].
For [17, Section IV-C], consider a modified construction of Q¯q. Fix an extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]}
process with A[Z1:N0 ] = z0 for z0 ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to proof that {A[Z1:Nq ]} ∈ (0, 1). Then let
Q¯q := A[Z1:Nq ](1− A[Z1:Nq ]), then have Q¯q ∈ (0, 1/4]. Thus from (56), have
Q¯q+1 =
A[Z
1:N
q Z
1:N ′
q ](1− A[Z1:Nq Z1:N ′q ]) if Bq+1 = 1
(2A[Z1:Nq ]− A[Z1:Nq Z1:N ′q ])(1− 2A[Z1:Nq ] + A[Z1:Nq Z1:N ′q ]) if Bq+1 = 0
(58)
Let
ζ =
√
(Q¯q+1|Bq+1 = 1)√
Q¯q
+
√
(Q¯q+1|Bq+1 = 0)√
Q¯q
(59)
and a = A[Z1:Nq ], b = A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ], thus
ζ =
√
b(1− b)
a(1− a) +
√
(2a− b)(1− 2a+ b)
a(1− a)
(a)
≤
√√√√√[√b(1− b)2 +√(2a− b)(1− 2a+ b)2] ·
√ 1
a(1− a)
2
+
√
1
a(1− a)
2

= 2
√
1− (a− b)
2
a(1− a)
(61)
where (a) is due to Cauchy’s inequality. It is easy to proof that A[Z1:Nq ] = A[Z1:Nq Z1:N
′
q ] only
when they equal to 0 or 1. Hence from {A[Z1:Nq ]} ∈ (0, 1), have ζ < 2. Thus we obtain
E[Q¯1/2q ] ≤ 12( ζ
2
4
)q/2, and then
P (Q¯q ≥ ρq) ≤ 1
2
(
ζ2
4ρ
)q/2 (62)
by Markov’s inequality. Therefore, we can have that for any ρ ∈ ( ζ2
4
, 1), sequence {ρq} is a.d.
over the class of extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]} process, according to [17, Section IV, Prop. 2].
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For [17, Section IV-D], fix an extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]} process and another process {A[Z˜1:Ni ]}
with m ∈ [[0, q]] that
A[Z˜1:Ni ] = A[Z1:Ni ], for i ∈ [[0,m]] (63)
and
A[Z˜1:Ni+1 ] =
A[Z˜
1:N
i Z˜
1:N ′
i ] if Bi+1 = 1
2A[Z˜1:Ni ] if Bi+1 = 0
for i ≥ m (64)
Note that it also satisfies A[Z˜1:Ni ] ≥ A[Z1:Ni ]. Thus from [17, Section IV, Prop. 3], by combining
all the modifications presented above, we can finally have that for any β < 1/2, the sequence
{2−2qβ} is u.d. over the class of extremal {A[Z1:Nq ]} process. Hence,
lim inf
q→∞
P (A[Z1:Nq ] ≤ 2−2
qβ
) = lim inf
n→∞
P (Zn ≤ 2−Nβ) = A[I1:N0 ] (65)
and Pe(N,R) = o(2−N
β
), which completes the proof of Prop. 5.
IV. IRREGULAR POLAR CODING FOR SA-WTC WITH DMC
In this section, we continue on the work of achieving the secrecy capacity of sA-WTC with
DMCs explicitly by applying the results of irregular polarization.
A. Equivalent Models for sA-WTC with DMC
The aim of building the equivalent models is to find a channel-form expression for the
directly reading the rewriting operation of eavesdropper, so that we can perform the polar codes
for constructing the secure coding schemes. For both directly reading or writing on a single
transmitted bit, the effects of these adversarial operations are the same as single bit BEC with
 = 0 or  = 1.
Definition 5 Define  as the channel cascading operation, for instance W 1 = W 2W 3. Define
two single bit BECs W0 and W1 with same input alphabet {0, 1} and same output alphabet
{0, 1, ?}, satisfying that erase probability  = 0 for W0 and  = 1 for W1.
Then the equivalent channels can be constructed as follow.
• Denote DMCs W 1:Nw : XN → VN → YN as the equivalent main channels for directly
rewriting, for i ∈ [[1, N ]], have
W iw =

W W1 : W iw(y|x) =
∑
v∈V
W (v|x)W1(y|v) if i ∈ Sw
W W0 : W iw(y|x) =
∑
v∈V
W (v|x)W0(y|v) otherwise
(66)
17
and C(W 1:Nw ) = (1− ρw)NC(W ).
• Denote DMCs W 1:Nr : XN → V˜N → ZN as the equivalent wiretap channels of directly
reading, for i ∈ [[1, N ]], have
W ir =

W˜ W0 : W ir(z|x) =
∑˜
v∈V˜
W˜ (v˜|x)W0(z|v˜) if i ∈ Sr
W˜ W1 : W ir(z|x) =
∑˜
v∈V˜
W˜ (v˜|x)W1(z|v˜) otherwise
(67)
and C(W 1:Nr ) = ρrNC(W˜ ).
• For special case that WN and W˜N are noiseless, i ∈ [[1, N ]], have
W iw =
W1 : W
i
w(y|x) = 1 if i ∈ Sw
W0 : W
i
w(y|x) = 0 otherwise
(68)
W ir =
W0 : W
i
r(z|x) = 0 if i ∈ Sr
W1 : W
i
r(z|x) = 1 otherwise
(69)
Since WN , W˜N , W0 and W1 are symmetric, the constructed equivalent channels W 1:Nw and
W 1:Nr are also symmetric.
B. Irregular Polarization of Equivalent Channels
Now apply the irregular polarization to the constructed equivalent channels.
For W 1:Nw , ρw fraction of channels equal to W1, and 1− ρw fraction of channels equal to W .
For β < 1/2, δN = 2−N
β , the irregularly polarized index sets of [[1, N ]] are
HWw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)wN) ≥ 1− δN}
LWw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)wN) ≤ δN}
(71)
where HWw is the polarized full-noise index set for Bob, and LWw is the polarized noiseless
index set for Bob.
Similarly for W 1:Nr , ρr fraction of channels equal to W˜ , and 1−ρr fraction of channels equal
to W1. By applying the irregular channel polarization, for β < 1/2, δN = 2−N
β , the polarized
index sets of [[1, N ]] are
HWr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)rN) ≥ 1− δN}
LWr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)rN) ≤ δN}
(73)
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where HWr is the polarized full-noise index set for Eve, and LWr is the polarized noiseless index
set for Eve.
Note for the case that WN and W˜N are noiseless (the basic A-WTC), Z(W iw) is either 0
with fraction 1 − ρw or 1 with fraction ρw, and Z(W ir) is either 0 with fraction ρr or 1 with
fraction 1− ρr, so for the recursion process of Z(W iw) and Z(W ir), there are only three possible
cases (1, 1) 7→ (1, 1), (1, 0) 7→ (1, 0) and (0, 0) 7→ (0, 0). Thus for the generated W (1:N)wN and
W
(1:N)
rN , the proportion of Z(W
(i)
wN) = 1 remains ρw and Z(W
(i)
wN) = 0 remains 1 − ρw, the
proportion of Z(W (i)rN) = 1 remains 1 − ρr and Z(W (i)rN) = 0 remains ρr. Thus for irregular
channel polarization, the polarized index sets of [[1, N ]] are
HWw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)wN) = 1}
LWw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)wN) = 0}
(75)
and
HWr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)rN) = 1}
LWr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)rN) = 0}
(77)
C. Secure Polar Coding Scheme
Owing to the irregularly polarized index sets of equivalent channels, now we can directly apply
the structure of strong security achieving coding in [11] (the multi-block chaining structure) to
the sA-WTC with DMCs .
Let (I,R,F ,B) be a subsets partition of index [[1, N ]], satisfies
I = LWw ∩HWr
F = (LWw)c ∩HWr
R = LWw ∩ (HWr)c
B = (LWw)c ∩ (HWr)c
(79)
Then considering a T times N -length block transmission over the sA-WTC with DMC, for
each t ∈ [[1, T ]], eavesdropper Eve can arbitrarily choose the reading set Str and the rewriting set
Stw under the constrains of fixed ρr and ρw. Because of the static assumption, we assume that
legitimate parties know both S1:Tr and S1:Tw at the beginning of first transmission. Thus, based on
the differently chosen Str and Stw, legitimate parties can have (It,Rt,F t,Bt) for each t. Further,
sperate an E t from It that E t ⊂ It and satisfies |E t| = |Bt+1|. Then we can have the encoding
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and decoding process of strong security achieving coding scheme for sA-WTC with DMC as
follow.
• Encoding:
– Assigning the uN : It \E t is assigned with information bits (uniform message bits); F t
is assigned with frozen bits; Rt and E t are assigned with uniformly distributed random
bits; Bt is assigned with pre-shared bits for t = 1 or with bits of E t−1 for t > 1.
– Encode u1:N to channel input x1:N by irregular polar coding x1:N = u1:NGN and
transmitted to Bob over the main channel WN .
• Decoding:
– Bob receives y1:N as the rewritten channel output from main channel.
– For i ∈ It ∪Rt, uˆi is decoded by the SC decoding as
uˆi = arg max
u∈{0,1}
W
(i)
wN(u|uˆ1:i−1, y1:N) (80)
– For i ∈ F t, uˆi is decoded as frozen bit.
– For i ∈ Bt, uˆi is decoded as the pre-shared bit in case t = 1 or as the correspondent
bit of uˆEt−1 of the (t− 1)-th time in case t > 1.
Note that for eavesdropper Eve, she directly reads v˜Str from the wiretap channel W˜N , and
directly rewrites vStw into ?.
D. Performance
Now we discuss the performance of the irregular secure polar coding scheme by reliability,
security and achievable secrecy rate.
1) Reliability: For each t ∈ [[1, T ]], information bits and random bits are transmitted by
the irregularly polarized subset Rt ∪ It = LtWw . Note that |LtWw | = NP (Z(W (i)wN) ≤ δN) by
(71). From Prop. 4, have P (Z(W (i)wN) ≤ δN) ≤ A[I(W 1:Nw )]. Thus based on Prop. 5, the error
probability of T times transmission is
Pe(T ) =
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Rt∪It
Z(W
(i)
wN) +
T∑
t=2
∑
i∈Et−1
Z(W
(i)
wN)
≤ (2T − 1)o(2−Nβ)
(82)
Thus limN→∞ Pe(T ) = 0 which achieves the reliability criterion in Def. 2.
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2) Strong security: For strong security, we analyze the information leakage of T tomes
transmission. Let L(T ) = I(M1:T ; Z1:T ) be the information leakage to Eve, where Mt = UIt\Et ,
Zt = ZN and additionally Et = UEt , Ft = UFt for t-th block transmission. Thus from [11,
Section IV-B], for the adapted multi-block chaining structure, have
L(T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
I(Mt,Et,Ft; Zt) + I(E0; Z0) (83)
with frozen bits Ft fixed to 0. Note that Eve do not know the pre-shared information, so
I(E0; Z0) = 0.
For any subset A of index N , denote a1 < a2 < ... < a|A| as the correspondent indices of the
elements UA, that UA , Ua1:a|A| = Ua1 , ..., Ua|A| . According to [10, Lemma 15], the subsets
It ∪ F t and Rt of irregular polarization match the construction of the induced channel, thus
satisfies
I(Mt,Et,Ft; Zt) =I(UI
t∪Ft ;ZN)
=
|It∪Ft|∑
i=1
I(Ua
i
;ZN |Ua1:ai−1)
(a)
=
|It∪Ft|∑
i=1
I(Ua
i
;Ua
1:ai−1 , ZN)
≤
|It∪Ft|∑
i=1
I(Ua
i
;U1:a
i−1
, ZN)
(85)
where (a) is because Uai are independent from each other.
According to (79), It ∪F t = HtWr . Then from (73), have Z(W (i)rN) ≥ 1− 2−N
β for i ∈ HtWr .
Note that I(W ) ≤√1− Z(W )2, thus I(W (i)rN) ≤ o(2−Nβ) for i ∈ HtWr . Hence I(Mt,Et,Ft; Zt) ≤
o(N2−N
β
), which indicates L(T ) ≤ o(TN2−Nβ).
For case that W˜N is noiseless (such as the basic A-WTC), have Z(W (i)rN) = 1 for i ∈ HtWr ,
which indicates that I(W (i)rN) = 0 . Thus I(M
t,Et,Ft; Zt) = 0 and L(T ) = 0.
Therefore have limN→∞ L(T ) = 0 for a fixed T , which achieves the strong security criterion
in Def. 2.
3) Achievable secrecy rate: As proofed previously, reliability and strong security criterions
are achieved by the proposed irregular secure polar coding. Now we discuss the achievable
secrecy rate of our scheme for sA-WTC with DMCs.
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Let Rs be the secrecy rate, then have Rs = 1TN
∑T
t=1 |It \ E t|. Since ET can be set to ∅, have
lim
N→∞
Rs ≥ lim
N→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
N
(|It| − |Bt|)
= lim
N→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
N
(|It ∪Rt| − |Bt ∪Rt|)
= lim
N→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
N
(|LtWw | − |(HtWr)c|)
(a)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
A[I(W 1:Nw )]− A[I(W 1:Nr )]|t
]
(b)
= (1− ρw)I(U ;V )− ρrI(U ; V˜ )
(87)
where (a) is due to Prop. 4 and Prop. 5, (b) is due to A[I(W 1:Nw )] = (1 − ρw)I(U ;V ),
A[I(W 1:Nr )] = ρrI(U ; V˜ ). Thus the secrecy capacity of sA-WTC with DMCs can be achieved
when N →∞.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the irregular channel transformation which is a modified GN
operation of Arıkan’s channel polarization by replacing the initial channels WN with W 1:N
with different transition probabilities. As we proofed, this irregular channel transformation has a
similar polarization effect for the initial W 1:N , named irregular channel polarization. Theoretical
results show that for any fixed δ ∈ (0, 1), as N → ∞, the fraction of indices i ∈ [[1, N ]] for
which I(W iN) ∈ (1−δ, 1] goes to A[I(W 1:N)] and the fraction for which I(W iN) ∈ [0, δ) goes to
1− A[I(W 1:N)]. Also, for any B-DMC W 1:N with I(W i) > 0, and any fixed R < A[I(W 1:N)]
and constant β < 1/2, there exists index set AN ⊂ [[1, N ]], |AN | ≤ NR that Pe(N,R) =∑
i∈AN Z(W
(i)
N ) = o(2
−Nβ).
For the secrecy capacity achieving problem of sA-WTC with DMCs, we have constructed
equivalent channels W 1:Nw and W
1:N
r by respectively connecting the W and W˜ with full noise
erase bit channel or noiseless erase bit channel to obtain the same effect of reading and rewriting
operation. By applying the irregular channel polarization to the constructed equivalent channels,
we successfully implement the strong security achieving polar coding scheme to the sA-WTC
with DMCs. As proofed, secrecy capacity has been achieved by this irregular secure polar coding
scheme under the reliability and strong security criterions.
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However, there are till some open problems. For the irregular polarization, we only have studied
its basic polarization characters and the polarization rate, thus a more comprehensive study on
whether it shares more commons with the original channel polarization is needed. Moreover,
for A-WTC with DMCs, our irregular secure polar coding is only constructed under the static
assumption which removes the initiative of eavesdropper. So the problem of constructing a secure
scheme against a active eavesdropper over A-WTC with DMC is still need for further research.
APPENDIX A
Here we proof the Prop.3. For channel transformation of (12), similarly as [9, Appendix E],
we have
Z(W+) =
∑
y1y2u1
√
W+(f(y1, y2), u1|0)W+(f(y1, y2), u1|0)
=
∑
y1y2u1
1
2
√
W 1(y1|u1)W 2(y2|0) ·
√
W 2(y1|u1 ⊕ 1)W 2(y2|1)
=
∑
y2
√
W 2(y2|0)W 2(y2|1) ·
∑
u1
1
2
∑
y1
√
W 1(y1|u1)W 1(y1|u1 ⊕ 1)
= Z(W 2)Z(W 1)
(89)
Z(W−) =
∑
y1y2
√
W−(f(y1, y2)|0)W−(f(y1, y2|1))
=
∑
y1y2
1
2
√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|0) +W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|1)
·
√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|1) +W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|0)
(a)
≤
∑
y1y2
1
2
[√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|0) +
√
W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|1)
]
·
[√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|1) +
√
W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|0)
]
−
∑
y1y2
√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|0)W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|1)
(b)
=Z(W 1) + Z(W 2)− Z(W 1)Z(W 2)
(91)
where (a) is due to[
(
√
ab+
√
cd)(
√
ad+
√
cb)− 2
√
abcd
]2
=
[√
(ab+ cd)(ad+ cb)
]2
+ 2(
√
a−√c)2(
√
b−
√
d)2
√
abcd
(93)
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Note that the equal of (a) holds when a = c or b = d or abcd = 0, which is satisfied when W 1
and W 2 are BECs. (b) is due to∑
y1y2
1
2
[√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|0) +
√
W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|1)
]
·
[√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|1) +
√
W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|0)
]
=
1
2
∑
y1
W 1(y1|0)
∑
y2
√
W 2(y2|0)W 2(y2|1) + 1
2
∑
y1
W 1(y1|1)
∑
y2
√
W 2(y2|0)W 2(y2|1)
+
1
2
∑
y2
W 2(y2|0)
∑
y1
√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y1|1) + 1
2
∑
y2
W 2(y2|1)
∑
y1
√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y1|1)
=Z(W 1) + Z(W 2)
(95)
and ∑
y1y2
√
W 1(y1|0)W 2(y2|0)W 1(y1|1)W 2(y2|1)
=
∑
y1
√
W 1(y1|0)W 1(y1|1) ·
∑
y2
√
W 2(y2|0)W 2(y2|1)
= Z(W 1)Z(W 2)
(97)
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